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HOLDING TORTFEASORS ACCOUNTABLE:
APPORTIONMENT OF ENHANCED INJURIES UNDER
WASHINGTON'S COMPARATIVE FAULT SCHEME
Ryan P. Harkins
Abstract: The enhanced-injury doctrine imposes a negligence-based duty to reasonably
minimize the foreseeable risk of injury enhancement in the event of primary accidents,
regardless of their cause. When apportioning responsibility for enhanced injuries under
principles of comparative fault, a majority of courts outside of Washington use a plaintiffs
fault in causing the primary accident to reduce recovery for enhanced injuries. A minority of
courts, however, rule that because the enhanced-injury doctrine presupposes the occurrence
of primary accidents, primary fault is legally irrelevant to apportionment of enhanced
injuries. Washington courts have not addressed this issue. This Comment argues that
Washington courts should not consider primary fault when apportioning responsibility for
enhanced injuries. First, primary fault is not "fault" with respect to enhanced injuries and,
therefore, should not reduce a plaintiff's recovery for enhanced injuries. Moreover,
Washington's comparative fault scheme and law regarding proximate cause require that
responsibility for enhanced injuries be apportioned using enhanced injury fault rather than
primary fault. Finally, using primary fault to reduce an enhanced injury recovery will result in
decreased product safety.
Mary did not see the stop sign.' In the back seat, her two children
would not stop making noise. Tired and irritated, she turned around to
quiet them as she approached the four-way stop. At fifteen miles per
hour, her automobile passed into the intersection without stopping and
was struck from the side by an automobile traveling at ten miles per
hour. The collision dented the two vehicles and all of the passengers
suffered minor bumps and bruises. Mary's negligence was the sole cause
of the collision and, for that reason, she is liable for the dented vehicles
and the passengers' minor injuries.
Now assume that due to a defect in the gasoline tank, Mary's vehicle
exploded when struck by the other automobile. The fire engulfed Mary's
vehicle and severely burned all inside. Instead of suffering only minor
bumps and bruises, Mary suffered disfiguring and disabling bums and
her two children were killed. Assume further that the fire would not have
occurred if the gasoline tank had not been defective. Hence, while the
gasoline tank defect did not cause the primary accident, it did lead to the
1185
I. Hypothetical created by the author.
Washington Law Review
fire. The gasoline tank defect enhanced the passengers' injuries from
mere bumps and bruises to severe bums.2
Under the doctrine of enhanced injuries, the automobile manufacturer
is liable for the enhanced injuries-the bums. The doctrine imposes on
product manufacturers a negligence-based duty to use reasonable care in
the design and construction of their products to minimize foreseeable
risks of harm.3 As in negligence cases generally, the elements of an
enhanced-injury cause of action are: (1) a duty to reasonably minimize
foreseeable risks of harm, and (2) a breach of that duty (3) which
proximately causes the plaintiff (4) to suffer identifiable damages. 4
In the present example, it is foreseeable that automobiles will be
involved in accidents with or without the fault of the plaintiff-driver.
Hence, the manufacturer of Mary's automobile owed her a duty to
reasonably design and construct her vehicle to minimize risks of harm in
such accidents. Production of the defective gasoline tank design
constituted a breach of that duty and proximately caused the enhanced
injuries. Under the doctrine of enhanced injuries, the manufacturer is
liable only for the bums, however, and not for the bumps and bruises,
because the bumps and bruises were proximately caused solely by
Mary's negligence.
Another layer of analysis is necessary in Washington because
Washington courts apply comparative fault, allowing proportionate
reduction of a plaintiffs recovery according to the percentage of
2. See infra Part I. This Comment employs several terms of art. The initial foreseeable accident-
the side-impact automobile collision resulting from Mary's negligence-is termed the primary
accident. The fault attributable to the primary accident-Mary running the stop sign-is primary
fault. The second accident-the gasoline tank explosion resulting from the defect in the gasoline
tank-is the enhanced-injury accident. The fault attributable to the enhanced-injury accident-the
manufacturer's fault in producing a defective gasoline tank-is enhanced-injury fault. Other terms,
such as "second collision," or "crashworthiness," have been used by courts and commentators to
describe these same concepts. See, e.g., Trust Corp. of Mont. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp.
1093, 1094 (D. Mont. 1981) (second collision); Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224, 225-30
(Iowa 1992) (crashworthiness). As one commentator has pointed out, however, those terms
inaccurately imply that the enhanced-injury doctrine applies only to automobile collisions. See
Thomas V. Harris, Enhanced-Injury Theory: An AnalyticFramework, 62 N.C. L. REv. 643, 647-51
& n.22 (1984). While the hypothetical example and most cases discussed in this Comment involve
automobile collisions, the enhanced-injury doctrine applies to product liability cases generally. See
Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 504 (8th Cir. 1968) (enhanced injury liability applies
"to all manufacturers"); Baumgardner v. Am. Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 758, 522 P.2d 829,
833 (1974) (holding that "manufacturers" can be liable for product defects that proximately cause
enhanced injuries); Harris, supra, at 647-51.
3. See Larsen, 391 F.2d at 499-506; Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 756-57, 522 P.2d at 832-33.
4. Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 758, 522 P.2d at 833; Harris, supra note 2, at 651.
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plaintiff fault that proximately caused the plaintiffs damages.' Using
comparative fault, the manufacturer will argue that Mary's fault in
causing the primary accident should proportionately reduce its monetary
responsibility for the bums suffered by Mary and her children. This
raises the question whether a Washington court should reduce the
damages awarded by the percentage of fault attributed to Mary in
causing the primary accident or find that Mary's fault in causing the
primary accident is legally irrelevant to the issue of damages resulting
from the enhanced-injury bums.
This Comment focuses solely on whether Washington courts should
consider primary fault when apportioning responsibility for enhanced
injuries under Washington's scheme of comparative fault. Prior to
addressing this question, the trier-of-fact in an enhanced-injury case
must first find that all elements of an enhanced-injury claim are met.
This Comment argues that Washington courts should not use primary
fault to reduce a plaintiff's recovery for enhanced injuries. Part I
describes the adoption of the enhanced-injury doctrine in Washington
State. Part II discusses basic tort law concepts that affect the application
of the enhanced injury doctrine in Washington. Part III explains the
conflicting resolutions of this issue outside of Washington. Part IV
argues that reducing a plaintiffs enhanced-injury recovery by primary
fault is inconsistent with basic tort law concepts, violates Washington's
comparative fault scheme, and would lead to decreased product safety.
I. THE ENHANCED-INJURY DOCTRINE IN WASHINGTON
In 1974, the Supreme Court of Washington adopted the enhanced-
injury doctrine.6 In Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp.,7 the
plaintiff sued American Motors after his wife was killed in an
automobile accident.8 Upon collision, her seat broke loose, crushing her
5. See infra Section II.
6. The seminal case recognizing the enhanced-injury doctrine was Larsen v. General Motors
Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). Prior to Larsen, courts were reluctant to permit an enhanced-
injury cause of action. See, eg., Evans v. Gen. Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1966);
Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802, 805-06 (N.Y. 1950); Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 34
N.W.2d 853, 858-59 (Wis. 1948). However, the Larsen position has been adopted by virtually all
American courts. See, e.g., Blankenship v. General Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 782 (W.Va.
1991) (noting that West Virginia became the last state to adopt the enhanced injury doctrine).
7. 83 Wash. 2d 751,522 P.2d 829 (1974).
8. Id. at 752, 522 P.2d at 830.
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between the seat and seat belt.9 Furthermore, her seat belt could not be
unlatched after the accident, severely exacerbating her injuries.'l The
plaintiff alleged that defects in his wife's seat and seatbelt buckle, while
not contributing to the cause of the original collision, caused or
enhanced his wife's injuries, thereby causing her death." The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of American Motors and the
plaintiff appealed. 2 The Supreme Court of Washington reversed, 3
holding that a manufacturer can be liable for product defects that
proximately cause enhanced injuries even though the defects do not
cause the accident. 14
The Baumgardner court held that the enhanced-injury doctrine rests
on common law negligence principles. 5 Generally, the elements of a
negligence cause of action are duty, breach, causation, and damages.6
Therefore, the elements in an enhanced-injury cause of action are: (1) a
duty to reasonably prevent foreseeable risks of enhanced injuries, and
(2) a breach of that duty (3) that proximately caused (4) distinct and
identifiable enhanced injuries. 7
Because the enhanced-injury doctrine is based on negligence
principles, the Baumgardner court stated that the primary determination
in an enhanced-injury claim is the imposition of a duty to minimize the
risk of injury enhancement." General negligence principles impose a
duty to use reasonable care to protect others. from foreseeable risk of
harm.'9 The imposition of a duty turns on foreseeability.20 Therefore, the
9. Id.
10. Id.
l1. Id. at 752-53, 522 P.2d at 830.
12. Id. at 753, 522 P.2d at 830.
13. Id. at 760, 522 P.2d at 834.
14. Id. at 758, 522 P.2d at 833.
15. Id. at 757-58, 522 P.2d at 833. In addition, Baumgardner held that liability for enhanced
injuries may also be established under strict liability. Id. at 759, 522 P.2d at 834. Proving an
enhanced injury claim under strict liability is beyond the scope of this Comment.
16. Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 129 Wash. 2d 43, 48, 914 P.2d 728, 731 (1996); see
also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th
ed. 1984).
17. Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 758, 522 P.2d at 833; see also Degel, 129 Wash. 2d at 48, 914
P.2d at 731; KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 30, at 164-65.
18. Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 756-57, 522 P.2d at 832.
19. KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 30, at 164-65.
20. See Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 754-57, 522 P.2d at 831-33; see also KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 16, § 43, at 280-81.
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imposition of an enhanced-injury duty turns on foreseeability. If a
manufacturer should foresee that its product creates a risk of enhancing
the injuries suffered in a primary accident, the manufacturer has a duty
to reasonably minimize that risk."'
Applying this foreseeability analysis, the Baumgardner court
concluded that it is clearly foreseeable to the manufacturer that
automobile collisions will occur' and that the magnitude of injury to
persons involved in such collisions will often depend on the design and
construction of the automobile.' Therefore, the manufacturer has a duty
to design and construct its automobiles to reasonably minimize the risk
of enhanced injuries in such collisions.2' This duty is imposed despite
the fact that automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with
other objects, because people cannot use automobiles without
encountering the foreseeable risk of injury-producing collisions. 5
The Baumgardner court recognized that the enhanced-injury duty is
not unlimited. It emphasized that a manufacturer's duty is to reasonably
minimize foreseeable risks of harm.26 It also emphasized that, under
basic negligence principles, a manufacturer is liable only for injuries or
enhancement of injuries proximately caused 7 by product defects. 8
Therefore, a breach of an enhanced-injury duty makes a manufacturer
liable only for the injury enhancement-i.e., that portion of the
plaintiffs damages that would not have occurred had the manufacturer
exercised reasonable care.'
Since Baumgardner, Washington courts have done little to further
define the parameters of the enhanced-injury doctrine and its interaction
21. See Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 754-57, 522 P.2d at 831-33; see also KEETON Er AL.,
supra note 16, § 43, at 280-81.
22. Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 755, 522 P.2d at 831-32 (quoting Larsen v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501-02 (8th Cir. 1968)).
23. Id. at 755, 522 P.2d at 832 (quoting Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E.2d 173, 185 (S.C. 1969)).
24. The question faced by the Baumgardner court was whether to adopt the enhanced-injury
doctrine in automobile collision cases. However, the court phrased its holding in much broader
language, implying that the enhanced-injury doctrine applies to product liability cases generally, as
recognized by Larsen. Specifically, the Baumgardner court held that "a manufacturer can be held
liable in negligence for design or manufacture defects which proximately cause enhanced injuries
due to such defects." Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 758, 522 P.2d at 833.
25. Id. at 754-55, 522 P.2d at 831-32 (quoting Larsen, 391 F.2d at 501-02).
26. Id. at 756-57, 522 P.2d at 832-33.
27. For a discussion of proximate cause, see infra Part IlI.B.
28. Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 758, 522 P.2d at 833.
29. Id.
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with other tort principles.3" In Bernal v. American Honda Motor Co., 3'
the Supreme Court of Washington recognized that Baumgardner
established an enhanced-injury cause of action.32 Furthermore, in Couch
v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 3 3 the court reiterated that, as in
negligence cases generally, the plaintiff must prove the elements of an
enhanced-injury claim, including the nature and extent of the injury
enhancement.34  However, Washington case law does not provide
guidance regarding the role of comparative fault in an enhanced-injury
claim. While Baumgardner established the negligence-based framework
for the enhanced-injury doctrine generally,35 no Washington court has
explicitly addressed whether a plaintiffs fault in causing the primary
accident should be considered for purposes of reducing recovery for an
enhanced injury.36
II. TORT LAW CONCEPTS IN WASHINGTON
Because the enhanced injury doctrine is based on negligence
principles, several tort law concepts affect the application of the doctrine
to individual cases. The applicable tort concepts include comparative
fault, the determination of duty, and proximate causation. This Section
provides background knowledge necessary to understand how those
concepts shape the application of the enhanced-injury doctrine to a
particular case.
30. See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat'] Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 148-50, 542 P.2d 774, 776-77
(1975) (recognizing that court has not addressed central issues relating to criteria, definitions, and
limitations of enhanced-injury theory).
31. 87 Wash. 2d 406, 553 P.2d 107 (1976).
32. Id. at 411,415, 553 P.2d at 110, 112.
33. 107 Wash. 2d 232, 728 P.2d 585 (1986).
34. Id. at 243, 728 P.2d at 591; see also Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 758, 522 P.2d at 833.
35. Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 757-58, 522 P.2d at 833.
36. See Couch, 107 Wash. 2d at 246, 728 P.2d at 592-93 (declining to rule on whether plaintiff's
fault in causing primary collision was relevant in determining cause of enhanced injury because jury
found plaintiff's comparative fault was not a proximate cause of his enhanced injuries); Amend v.
Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 130-34, 570 P.2d 138, 142-44 (1977) (holding that evidence of seatbelt use
is inadmissible in Washington and, consequently, not addressing issue of whether, under
comparative fault, a plaintiffs primary fault can reduce recovery for enhanced injuries).
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A. Washington 's Scheme of Comparative Fault
Under Washington's scheme of comparative fault, tort defendants can
claim that the plaintiff was also at fault in order to eliminate or reduce
the defendant's responsibility for damages. Proving plaintiff fault
involves the same elements of proof required to prove a defendant's
fault.37 The defendant must prove that (1) the plaintiff owed herself a
duty, (2) breached that duty, (3) and proximately caused (4) damages to
herself.38 Over the past thirty years, the Washington State Legislature
has repeatedly changed the legal effect that a finding of plaintiff fault
has on a plaintiff s claim.
Prior to 1973, a plaintiffs contributory negligence completely barred
recovery for damages in a negligence cause of action in Washington.39 In
1973, the Washington State Legislature abolished this complete bar to
recovery by adopting a system of pure comparative fault.4" Thus, the
effect of plaintiff negligence changed from a complete bar to a reduction
of recovery in proportion to the plaintiff's percentage of negligence.4"
However, the 1973 act did not affect all tort causes of action; the act
referred only to negligence claims and, therefore, did not apply to all
product liability causes of action.42
37 See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (2000) ("Fault includes acts or omissions ... that are in
any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others...."); see
also Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash. 2d 833, 838, 854 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1993) (quoting Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash.2d 230, 238, 588 P.2d 1308, 1314 (1978) ("'A
plaintiff's negligence relates to a failure to use due carefor his own protection ....- )); KEETON Er
AL., supra note 16, § 65, at 451 ("Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he
is required to conform for his own protection.").
38 Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 129 Wash. 2d 43, 48, 914 P.2d 728, 731 (1996). See
also KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 30, at 164-65.
39 See, eg., Godfrey v. Washington, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 965, 530 P.2d 630, 633 (1975); Franklin
v. Engel, 34 Wash. 480,485,76 P. 84, 85 (1904).
40. Ch. 137, §1, 1973 Wash Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 949 (codified at WAH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010
(1973)) (repealed 1981) ("Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action ... but any
damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to
the party recovering.").
41. Godfrey, 84 Wash. 2d at 965,530 P.2d at 633.
42. Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319, 323, 609 P.2d 1382, 1384 (1980). At the time, a
plaintiff could bring a product liability claim under five different theories. See, e.g., Daughtry v. Jet
Aeration Co., 91 Wash. 2d 704, 709-11,592 P.2d 631, 633-34 (1979) (express warranty); Teagle v.
Fischer & Porter Co., 89 Wash. 2d 149, 154, 570 P.2d 438, 441 (1977) (strict liability) (citing
Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975); Ulmer v. Ford Motor
Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969)); Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347,354-55,
378 P.2d 298, 302-03 (1963) (implied warranties of merchantability and fitness); Martin v.
1191
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In 1981 the Washington Legislature altered Washington's
comparative fault landscape again when it passed the Product Liability
and Tort Reform Act. 3 The 1981 Act codified Washington product
liability law, providing that there shall be a single "product liability
claim."" In addition, the Act recodified Washington's scheme of
comparative fault, providing that the scheme would apply to all causes
of action based on "fault"45 and defining "fault" to include both "misuse
of a product" and conduct subjecting a party to liability under a product
liability cause of action. 6 Therefore, unlike its 1973 predecessor, the
1981 Act explicitly applied Washington's comparative fault scheme to
all product liability causes of action. 7
The 1981 Act provides that a claimant's fault proportionately
diminishes recovery of "compensatory damages for an injury attributable
to the claimant's ... fault. ' 4 In addition, it provides that legal causation
requirements 49 apply when considering fault for both plaintiffs and
defendants under Washington's comparative fault scheme." Further,
when apportioning fault, the court must consider the nature of each
Schoonover, 13 Wash. App. 48, 54-56, 533 P.2d 438, 442-43 (1975) (negligence); see also Celia
E. Holuk & Donna L. Walker, Products Liability-Tort Reform: An Overview of Washington "s New
Act, 17 GONZAGA L. REV. 357, 372-73 (1982). In Seay, the Washington Supreme Court held that
the 1973 Comparative Fault Act did not apply to strict product liability causes of action, reasoning
that it applied only to negligence-based claims. Seay, 93 Wash. 2d at 319, 609 P.2d at 1382.
43. Ch. 27, 1981 Wash. Laws 112 (codified at scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22,
7.72 (2000)).
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(4). The statute provides, among other things, that a
manufacturer's failure to implement a safeguard on a product is negligent where "at the time of
manufacturer, the likelihood [P] that the product would cause the claimant's harm or similar harms,
and the seriousness [L] of those harms outweighed the burden [B] on the manufacturer" to
implement the safeguard. Id. § 7.72.030. In other words, a manufacturer's failure to implement a
safeguard is negligent where B<PL. Thus, the statute defines negligence by using the formula
devised by Learned Hand to discuss the incentives to exercise care created by negligence law. See
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). This formula is also relevant
to the incentives to exercise care created by the enhanced-injury doctrine. See infra Section IV.C.2.
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005.
46. Id. § 4.22.015.
47. See id. §§ 7.72.010(4), 4.22.005-.015; Lundberg v. All-Pure Chem. Co., 55 Wash. App. 181,
186, 777 P.2d 15, 19 (1989) ("Thus, the Legislature has determined that the comparative fault
doctrine shall apply to all actions based on 'fault,' including strict liability and product liability
claims.").
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005.
49. For conduct to be a proximate cause of a plaintiff's damages, it must be both: (1) a cause-in-
fact and (2) a legal cause of the damages. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015.
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party's conduct and the extent of the causal relation between that
conduct and the resulting damages. 1
In 1986, the Washington State Legislature supplemented the 1981
Product Liability and Tort Reform Act with the 1986 Tort Reform Act."2
Previously in Washington, a plaintiff could recover, under joint and
several liability, the full amount of her damages from any defendant who
contributed to those damages. 3 However, the 1986 Act abolished joint
and several liability, except in cases where the plaintiff is not at fault."
In making this change, the Act provided that, when apportioning
responsibility for a claimant's damages, the fault of every entity that
"caused" the claimant's damages shall be considered." The entities
whose fault will be considered include, among others, "the claimant or
person suffering personal injury or... property damage .... Thus, by
forcing courts to apportion percentages of fault among various parties,
the legislature intended to hold each party accountable for only that
portion of damages caused by its own fault.
B. Determining the Existence of Duty
Enhanced-injury claims require the imposition of a negligence-based
duty. 7 The imposition of a duty turns on foreseeability-whether the
risk of a harm occurring is foreseeable from the alleged tortfeasor's
perspective.58 A duty to reasonably minimize enhanced injuries is
imposed because the risk of enhanced injuries is foreseeable.59
Therefore, foreseeability plays a central role in determining whether
certain conduct constitutes a breach of an enhanced-injury duty and,
51. Id.
52. Ch. 305, 1986 Wash. Laws 1354 (codified at scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE §§
4.16, 4.22, 4.24, 4.56, 5.40, 5.60, 7.70, 48.19, 48.22, 51.24). WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1).
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070.
54. Id.
In all actions involving fault of more than one entity, the trier of fact shall determine the
percentage of the total fault which is attributable to every entity which caused the claimant's
damages .... Judgment shall be entered against each defendant ... in an amount which
represents that party's proportionate share of the claimant's total damages.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 4.22.070(1).
57. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
58. King v. Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 248, 525 P.2d 228, 234 (1974); Wells v. City of
Vancouver, 77 Wash. 2d 800, 802-03, 467 P.2d 292, 294-95 (1970).
59. Baumgardner v. Am. Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751,756-57, 522 P.2d 829, 832 (1974).
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thus, whether that conduct may be deemed fault with respect to an
enhanced injury. Only conduct that constitutes fault with respect to a
particular harm can be used to apportion responsibility for that harm
under Washington comparative fault law.6°
The imposition of a negligence duty turns on the foreseeability of the
consequences of an act. As Justice Cardozo stated in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R. Co.,6' "[n]egligence, like risk, is... a term of relation. '62 A
"bad act," by itself, does not make a party liable for harm. Rather, a
party can be liable for a particular harm only if, from the party's
perspective, the occurrence of that harm was a foreseeable consequence
of the "bad act. ' 63 Hence, the party has no duty to prevent a particular
harm and, thus, cannot be liable for the occurrence of that harm unless,
from the party's perspective, the harm was a foreseeable consequence of
the act.64 Moreover, the exact manner in which the harm occurs need not
be foreseeable as long as the occurrence of the harm itself was a
foreseeable consequence of the act.
65
The question of whether a party has a duty to reasonably minimize a
particular harm is entirely separate from whether the party has another
duty to reasonably minimize a different harm.66 Each distinct harm
corresponds to a distinct potential duty.67 A particular harm imposes a
duty to reasonably minimize the risk of that harm only if, from the
party's perspective, that harm is a foreseeable consequence of the party's
behavior.68 For example, our hypothetical plaintiff, Mary, has a duty, D1,
to reasonably minimize the risk of the harm, H1, only if, from Mary's
perspective, the risk of H, is foreseeable. Failing to reasonably minimize
the risk of H1, for example by committing an act, A, would constitute a
60. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.005, .015, .070.
61. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Washington courts have consistently adopted the reasoning of
Justice Cardozo's Palsgraf opinion. See King, 84 Wash. 2d at 248, 525 P.2d at 234; Wells, 77
Wash. 2d at 802-03, 467 P.2d at 294-95.
62. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101.
63. Id. ("Negligence in the abstract, apart from things related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is
understandable at all.... Negligence is not a tort unless it results in the commission of a wrong, and
the commission of a wrong imports the violation of a right.").
64. Id.
65. King, 84 Wash. 2d at 248, 525 P.2d at 234.
66. See Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. Ltd. (the "Wagon Mound
#1"), [1961] App. Cas. 388, 426 (P.C. 1961).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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breach of D, and, therefore, make Mary liable for Hl.69 Further, if it is
foreseeable from Mary's perspective that another harm, 112, could occur,
then Mary has a separate and distinct duty, D2 , to reasonably minimize
the risk of 112." Failing to reasonably minimize the risk of 112, for
example by engaging in certain conduct, designated A2, would constitute
a breach of D2 and, therefore, make Mary liable for H2."'
The fact that Mary has a duty, D1, to reasonably minimize the risk of
the harm, H, is irrelevant to the question of whether Mary has a duty,
D2, to reasonably minimize the risk of the harm, 112.72 As Lord Simonds
wrote in the famous Wagon Mound case, each duty "rests on its own
bottom.... The risk of each separate harm must be foreseeable from
Mary's perspective in order to impose each separate duty.74
Correspondingly, the mere fact that Mary has breached a duty, D1, for
example by committing an act, A, is often irrelevant to whether Mary
has breached a duty, D2. 5 A, can constitute a breach of D2, thereby
making Mary liable for H2, only if it is foreseeable from Mary's
perspective that A1 creates an unreasonable risk of 112.76 Therefore, if it
is foreseeable from Mary's perspective that A1, creates an unreasonable
risk of 111, but it is not foreseeable that A, creates an unreasonable risk
of 112, then committing A, would make Mary liable for 11, but not for
12.V
C. Determining Proximate Cause
In Washington, an actor's conduct must also constitute a proximate
cause of a harm in order to make the actor liable for the harm. Proximate
cause consists of two elements: cause-in-fact and legal causation.78 To
satisfy the cause-in-fact element, a breach must produce the harm
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Mk-, Inc., 134 Wash. 2d 468, 478, 951 P.2d 749, 754 (1998);
Taggart v. Sandau, 118 Wash. 2d 195, 225, 822 P.2d 243, 258 (1992); Hartley v. Washington, 103
Wash. 2d 768,777, 698 P.2d 77, 82 (1985).
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complained of in a direct, unbroken sequence.79 This is also referred to
as "but for" causation, as the harm would not have occurred "but for" the
actor's breach. 80
Legal causation involves a determination of whether, as a matter of
policy, the connection between the defendant's breach and the resultant
harm is too remote or insubstantial to impose liability.8 Legal causation
and duty are intertwined and virtually identical because some of the
policy considerations analyzed in determining whether a duty was owed
by a party are also analyzed when determining whether a party's breach
constituted a legal cause of the harm at issue.82 However, the questions
of duty and legal cause are not identical.8 Rather, even where a harm is
foreseeable and, thus, a duty is imposed, a party's breach of that duty
may not be a legal cause of the resulting harm if sound policy reasons
require that the party not be liable for the harm.84
In Hartley v. Washington," for example, the Supreme Court of
Washington found a lack of legal causation in a case where a decedent
was killed by a drunk driver.86 The drunk driver had previously been
arrested numerous times for driving while intoxicated and, therefore,
was subject to a revocation of his driver's license by the State.87 The
decedent's estate alleged that the State's failure to revoke the drunk
driver's license negligently caused the decedent's death.88 The court held
that the State's failure to revoke the drunk driver's license formed too
attenuated a causal connection with-and therefore was not a legal cause
of-the decedent's death.89 The court reasoned that (1) revocation of the
license would not have prevented the driver from driving, (2) a license
79. Schooley, 134 Wash. 2d at 478, 951 P.2d at 754; Taggart, 118 Wash. 2d at 226, 822 P.2d at
258; Hartley, 103 Wash. 2d at 778, 698 P.2d at 83.
80. Schooley, 134 Wash. 2d at 478, 951 P.2d at 754; Taggart, 118 Wash. 2d at 226, 822 P.2d at
258; Hartley, 103 Wash. 2d at 778, 698 P.2d at 83.
81. Schooley, 134 Wash. 2d at 478 79, 951 P.2d at 754; Taggart, 118 Wash. 2d at 226, 822 P 2d
at 258; Hartley, 103 Wash. 2d at 779, 698 P.2d at 83.
82. Schooley, 134 Wash. 2d at 479, 951 P.2d at 755; Taggart, 118 Wash. 2d at 226, 822 P.2d at
258; Hartley, 103 Wash. 2d at 779-80, 698 P.2d at 83-84.
83. Schooley, 134 Wash. 2d at 479, 951 P.2d at 755.
84. Id.
85. 103 Wash. 2d 768, 698 P.2d 77 (1985).
86. Id. at 770, 698 P.2d at 79.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 770, 698 P.2d at 78.
89. Id. at 784-85, 698 P.2d at 86.
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does not grant authority to disobey the law, and (3) otherwise, the State
would be open to unlimited liability."
Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Market, Inc.9" provides another example of
the determination of legal causation. In that case, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that a store's illegal sale of alcohol could be a legal
cause of an intoxicated minor's injuries. In Schooley, a vendor sold
alcohol to a minor who then furnished it to the plaintiff, who was also a
minor.92 After consuming the alcohol and becoming intoxicated, the
plaintiff dove into a partially empty swimming pool. The impact
fractured her spinal cord, leaving her a quadriplegic.93 The vendor
argued that the sale of alcohol was not a legal cause of the plaintiff's
injuries; it reasoned that extending the legal consequences of the initial
sale of alcohol to the plaintiffs injuries-which the vendor contended
were remote and due to the subsequent transfer of the alcohol-would
expose the vendor to unlimited liability.94 The court rejected the
vendor's argument, however, and held that the sale of alcohol could
constitute a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries.9" The court reasoned
that the vendor could prevent liability by refusing to sell alcohol to a
minor or forcing a suspicious potential buyer to fill out and sign a
certification card.96 Furthermore, the court noted that a minor who
consumes alcohol could be found contributorily negligent, and the
vendor's liability would be limited by both foreseeability and the
doctrine of superseding causes.97
An intervening act can constitute a break in the chain of causation
and, thus, constitute a superseding cause of a harm, relieving a party of
liability for that harm.98 An intervening act is a superseding cause when
90. Id. at 785, 698 P.2d at 86-87.
91. 134 Wash. 2d 468, 951 P.2d 749 (1998).
92. Id. at 472, 951 P.2d at 751.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 474, 951 P.2d at 752.
95. Id. at 483, 951 P.2d at 757.
96. Id. at 481, 951 P.2d at 755-56.
97. Id.
98. A line of cases from the Washington Court of Appeals has stated that the issue of superseding
causes is analyzed under the legal cause prong of proximate cause. See, e-g., Bullard v. Bailey, 91
Wash. App. 750, 758, 959 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1998); Cramer v. Dep't of Highways, 73 Wash. App.
516, 521, 870 P.2d 999, 1001 (1994); Anderson v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Corp., 48 Wash. App. 432,
442, 739 P.2d 1177, 1184 (1987). However, in McCoy v. American Suzul Motor Corp., 136 Wash.
2d 350, 358, 961 P.2d 952, 957 (1998), the Supreme Court of Washington stated that superseding
causes should be analyzed under the cause-in-fact prong of proximate cause. The question of
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it was not reasonably foreseeable.99 This typically means that an
intervening act constitutes a superseding cause where the act (1) brings
about a different type of harm than otherwise would have resulted from
the actor's conduct; or (2) operates independently of the situation
created by the defendant's conduct. 00 In McCoy v. American Suzuki
Motor Corp., 10' the plaintiff was struck by a vehicle while stopping to
help a motorist whose car had overturned, allegedly due to a defect in
the car. The plaintiff sued the car's manufacturer, Suzuki, for his
injuries. Suzuki argued that its negligence did not constitute a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's damages because it was unforeseeable that a
rescuer would be injured by a third vehicle.0 2 The court held, however,
that whether the plaintiffs rescue attempt and the third driver's
negligence constituted superseding causes of the plaintiffs harm was a
question for the jury.°3
III. OTHER COURTS' APPROACHES TO THE APPLICATION OF
COMPARATIVE FAULT IN ENHANCED-INJURY CLAIMS
Some federal and state courts outside of Washington have addressed
whether, under a scheme of comparative fault, primary fault should be
compared with enhanced-injury fault when apportioning damages in
enhanced-injury cases. A majority of courts favor comparing0 4 primary
fault with enhanced-injury fault, thereby reducing the plaintiff's
recovery for enhanced injuries in proportion to the plaintiffs primary
fault. These courts favor such a comparison for various reasons: some
courts fail to distinguish between primary injuries and the enhancement
of injuries, others assume that fault for the primary accident is a
proximate cause of enhanced injuries, and still other courts state that
whether superseding causes should be analyzed under cause-in-fact or legal cause is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
99. McCoy, 136 Wash. 2d at 358, 961 P.2d at 957; Bullard, 91 Wash. App. at 758-59, 959 P.2d
at 1127; Cramer, 73 Wash. App. at 520-21, 870 P.2d at 1001; Anderson, 48 Wash. App. at 442-
43, 739 P.2d at 1184.
100. Campbell v. ITE Imperial Corp., 107 Wash. 2d 807, 813, 733 P.2d 969, 973 (1987);
Anderson, 48 Wash. App. at 444, 739 P.2d at 1185.
101. 136 Wash. 2d 350, 961 P.2d 952 (1998).
102. Id. at 358, 961 P.2d at 957.
103. Id.
104. As used in this Comment, the terms "compare" and "comparing" mean that the court uses
both the primary fault and enhanced-injury fault to apportion responsibility for a plaintiff's
enhanced injuries.
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primary fault should be compared with enhanced-injury fault. A minority
of courts, however, use only enhanced-injury fault to apportion
responsibility for enhanced injuries. The minority courts distinguish
between primary injuries and injury enhancement, reasoning that only
breach of an enhanced-injury duty may make a party responsible for
enhanced injuries.
A. The Majority Approach: Reduction of a Plaintiff's Enhanced Injury
Recovery by the Plaintiff's Primary Fault
1. Divisibility of Primary and Enhanced Injury Claims
Many of the majority courts fail to distinguish between injury
enhancement and primary injuries when apportioning responsibility for
damages.'0 5 Instead, these courts treat the plaintiffs enhanced injuries
and primary injuries as inseparable. Therefore, the plaintiffs primary
fault is compared with the manufacturer's enhanced-injury fault and
responsibility is apportioned for all of the plaintiffs injuries without
differentiating between the primary injuries and the enhancement of the
primary injuries. For example, in Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper
Aircraft Corp.,' the decedent negligently caused his plane to crash but
allegedly died as a result of the defendant's failure to provide a shoulder
harness restraint system in the aircraft.'0 7 The plaintiff argued that the
primary-accident-causing factors and enhanced-injury-causing factors
are qualitatively different and must be considered separately. Therefore,
according to the plaintiff, for purposes of apportionment of the enhanced
injuries, the court should exclude evidence of the cause of the crash and
focus solely on evidence of the plaintiffs injury enhancement." 8
However, the court ruled that, under Montana law, the plaintiffs
contributory negligence in causing the initial accident should be
compared with the defendant's failure to provide a shoulder harness
105. See, e.g., Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414, 1419 (10th Cir. 1996); Keltner v. Ford
Motor Co., 748 F.2d 1265, 1267-68 (8th Cir. 1984); Hinkamp v. Am. Motors Corp., 735 F. Supp.
176, 178 (E.D.N.C. 1989); Trust Corp. of Mont. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093, 1098
(D. Mont. 1981); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414,428 (Tex. 1984).
106. 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981).
107. Id. at 1094.
108. Id.
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restraint system."0 9 The court stated that, while the view opposing such a
comparison has some merit, courts should consider all of the factors that
contributed to the event that caused the plaintiffs injuries."0
Consequently, the court declined to draw a clear line between the
primary accident and the injury enhancement.
Other courts have offered additional reasons for refusing to analyze
injury enhancement as separate and distinct from primary injuries. One
court has stated that refusing to compare primary fault with enhanced-
injury fault would make it too difficult to instruct the jury on
apportionment."' Furthermore, some commentators have argued that, in
practice, it is very difficult to distinguish between collision-causing and
injury-causing fault. '2 Under the laws of physics, the enhancement of
injuries correlates to the severity of the collision-the more severe the
collision, the more enhanced the injuries.' 3 For example, not all injury
enhancements can be as clearly defined as bums resulting from an
explosion. It is possible that injury enhancement will merely increase the
severity of the injuries incurred in the primary accident. Hence, these
commentators argue, any conduct influencing the severity of a collision
is a proximate cause of enhanced injury and should be compared with a
manufacturer's fault. 114
2. Primary Fault as a Proximate Cause of Enhanced Injuries
Some courts assume that fault for the primary accident is a proximate
cause of enhanced injuries. Consequently, these courts compare primary
fault with enhanced-injury fault when apportioning responsibility for
enhanced injuries." 5 For example, in Meekins v. Ford Motor Co.," 6 the
driver of an automobile was involved in an accident in which the
109. Id. at 1098.
110. Id.
111. Meekins v. Ford Motor Co., 699 A.2d 339, 346 (Del. 1997).
112. Heather Fox Vickles & Michael E Oldham, Enhanced Injury Should Not Equal Enhanced
Liability, 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 417,439 (1995).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 439-40.
115. See, e.g., Hinkamp v. Am. Motors Corp., 735 F. Supp. 176, 178 (E.D.N.C. 1989); Zuern v.
Ford Motor Co., 937 P.2d 676, 681-82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Meekins, 699 A.2d at 346; Kidron,
Inc. v. Carmona, 665 So. 2d 289, 292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
897 S.W.2d 684, 694 (Tenn. 1995).
116. 699 A.2d 339 (Del. 1997).
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automobile's airbag deployed." 7 The driver sued Ford, alleging that a
defect in the air bag crushed the fingers in his left hand against the
steering wheel when the airbag deployed.' Ford raised the defense of
comparative negligence, claiming that the cause of the driver's injuries
was his failure to stop at a stop sign. 19 The driver countered that, even if
he had caused the accident, his negligence should not be compared with
Ford's negligence in defectively designing the airbag that caused his
fingers to be crushed. 2° However, the Meekins court ruled that, under
comparative fault principles, the driver's negligence in causing the initial
accident should be compared with Ford's negligence in defectively
designing the airbag. 2' The court reasoned that "[i]t is obvious that the
negligence of a plaintiff who causes the initial collision is one of the
proximate causes of all of the injuries he sustained," regardless of
whether the injuries stem from the initial collision or a product defect.'
Other courts reduce plaintiff recovery by analogizing to the doctrine
of subsequent tortfeasors.'" Under this doctrine, negligence by an
original tortfeasor exposes that tortfeasor to liability for increased harm
caused by the subsequent negligence of other tortfeasors 24 For example,
a party who is initially at fault for causing an accident can be held liable
for additional injuries incurred by the victim through subsequent
negligent medical treatment."as Courts that rely on this reasoning state
that it is just as foreseeable to a primary accident-tortfeasor that
equipment in a car may be defective as it is that a doctor may negligently
treat the plaintiff's injuries.'26 Because the primary tortfeasor is liable in
the latter case for the additional injuries caused by the negligent medical
treatment, these courts reason that the plaintiff in an enhanced-injury
case should be held at least partially responsible for causing the
enhanced injuries.127
117. Id. at 340.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at346.
122. Id.
123. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1217-18 (Alaska 1998); Moore v.
Chrysler Corp., 596 So. 2d 225, 238 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
124. KEETONETAL.,supra note 16, § 44, at 301.
125. KEETON ETAL., supra note 16, § 44, at 310.
126. See, e-g., Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at 1217-18; Moore, 596 So. 2d at 238.
127. See, e.g., Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at 1217-18; Moore, 596 So. 2d at 238.
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3. Policy Concerns
Other courts conclude, with little analysis, that primary fault should
be compared with enhanced-injury fault. Some of these courts state that
comparative fault applies to strict liability, product liability, or
enhanced-injury claims. 2 Then, with little analysis of the manner in
which comparative fault should operate in enhanced-injury claims, or the
types of "fault" that should be compared in an enhanced-injury case,
these courts compare primary fault with enhanced-injury fault."9 For
example, in Kidron, Inc. v. Carmona,30 the driver of a pickup truck was
killed when he negligently drove into the rear of a delivery truck.' The
force of the impact shoved the smaller pickup truck under the delivery
truck's rear assembly, which cut through the passenger compartment of
the pickup, killing the driver. 32 The decedent's estate brought suit
against the manufacturer of the delivery truck, alleging negligence and
strict liability in assembling the truck without a rear under-ride guard,
which allegedly would have prevented the pickup truck from being
forced underneath the delivery truck's bed during the collision.' 33 Kidron
raised the defense of comparative negligence, arguing that the
decedent's fault in causing the initial accident should reduce any
recovery for the enhanced injuries that caused his death.' The trial
court denied Kidron's defense, 3 ' but the Florida Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the manufacturer's defense should have gone to
the jury.'36 The Court of Appeals characterized the issue as "whether the
rules of comparative negligence should apply in a claim for strict
liability in the context of [an enhanced-injury claim] . . . .""' The court
then concluded "that principles of comparative negligence should be
128. See, e.g., Zuern v. Ford Motor Co., 937 P.2d 676, 681-82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Daly v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Cal. 1978); Kidron, Inc. v. Carmona, 665 So.2d 289, 292
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Day v. Gen. Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349, 357 (N.D. 1984);
Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp., 897 S.W.2d 684, 694 (Tenn. 1995).
129. Zuern, 937 P.2d at 681-82; Daly, 575 P.2d at 1175; Kidron, 665 So.2d at 292-93; Day,
345 N.W.2d at 358; Whitehead, 897 S.W.2d at 694.
130. 665 So. 2d 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
131. Id. at 290.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 291.
137. Id. at 292.
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applied in the same manner in a strict liability suit, regardless of whether
the injury at issue has resulted from the primary or secondary
collision."'3
Other courts state that fairness and good reason mandate a
comparison of primary fault with enhanced-injury fault.'39 In addition,
some commentators have argued that public policy dictates comparing
primary fault with enhanced-injury fault in automobile cases in order to
deter driver misconduct.14 ° Otherwise, they contend, drivers will have
insufficient incentives to abstain from negligent driving. 4 '
B. The Minority Approach: Distinguishing Between the Primary
Injuries and the Enhanced Injuries
A minority of courts do not compare primary fault with enhanced-
injury fault when apportioning responsibility for enhanced injuries.'42
These courts focus solely on the enhancement of injuries because the
enhanced-injury doctrine presupposes the occurrence of primary
accidents, regardless of their cause. 43 They note that an enhanced-injury
duty requires reasonable steps to prevent only the enhancement of
injuries in such accidents.1" Furthermore, because an enhanced-injury
duty focuses solely on enhancement of injuries, these courts distinguish
between proximate cause of the primary accident and proximate cause of
enhanced injuries.4 ' They further state that only breach of a duty to
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414, 1419 (10th Cir. 1996); Trust Corp. of
Mont. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (D. Mont. 1981). Some commentators have
argued that refusing to compare all of a plaintiff's conduct places "extraordinary hardships" on
manufacturers who are singled out for "discriminatory application" of proximate cause and
comparative fault principles. Vickles & Oldham, supra note 112, at 439.
140. Vickles & Oldham, supra note 112, at 440.
141. Vickles & Oldham, supra note 112, at 440.
142. See, eg., Kutsugeras v. AVCO Corp., 973 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (7th Cir. 1992); Jimenez v.
Chrysler Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d 548, 566 (D.S.C. 1999); Timmons v. Ford Motor Co., 949 F. Supp.
859, 862-63 (S.D. Ga. 1996); Cota v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 684 P.2d 888, 895-96 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984); Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224, 230 (Iowa 1992); Andrews v. Harley Davidson,
Inc., 796 P.2d 1092, 1095-96 (Nev. 1990).
143. See, eg., Kutsugeras, 973 F.2d at 1344-45; Jimenez, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 566; Cota, 684 P.2d
at 894-95; Reed, 494 N.W.2d at 230; Andrews, 796 P.2d at 1095-96.
144. See, e.g., Kutsugeras, 973 F.2d at 1344-45; Jimenez, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 566; Cota, 684 P.2d
at 895-96; Reed, 494 N.W.2d at 230; Andrews, 796 P.2d at 1095.
145. See, eg., Kutsugeras, 973 F.2d at 1344-45; Jimenez, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 566; Cota, 684 P.2d
at 895-96; Reed, 494 N.W.2d at 230; Andrews, 796 P.2d at 1095.
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prevent enhanced injuries can constitute a proximate cause of such
injuries. 14 6 Moreover, they reason that the cause of the primary accident,
while relevant to the cause of the primary injuries, is legally irrelevant to
the cause of the enhanced injuries. 147
The Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. Chrysler Corp.48
provides an example of the minority approach. In Reed, the plaintiff was
a passenger in a Jeep whose driver, intoxicated and speeding, negligently
drove off the road.'49 Once off the road, the Jeep rolled onto its
fiberglass top, breaking it, and continued to slide 300 feet in an upside-
down position. 5 During the vehicle's slide, the plaintiffs arm became
pinched between the Jeep's roll bar and the highway, causing severe
fractures. 5 ' The plaintiff alleged that Chrysler negligently designed its
hardtop with fiberglass instead of steel, and that this defect caused his
arm injury."'
Chrysler sought to introduce evidence that the plaintiff and driver
were intoxicated prior to the primary collision."' The Iowa Supreme
Court held, however, that evidence of the driver's and plaintiffs
intoxication was irrelevant to liability for the plaintiffs enhanced
injuries. 4  The court reasoned that the enhanced-injury theory
presupposes the occurrence of primary collisions, whatever their
cause. 5-' Therefore, courts should focus solely on the enhancement of the
plaintiff's injuries and, for that reason, ought to concentrate only on the
manufacturer's fault in enhancing the plaintiffs injuries. 56 Any part that
the plaintiff played in causing the primary collision was irrelevant.'57
A United States District Court has also held that primary fault should
not be compared with enhanced-injury fault, not only because primary
146. See, e.g., Kuisugeras, 973 F.2d at 1344-45; Jimenez, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 566; Cota, 684 P.2d
at 895-96; Reed, 494 N.W.2d at 230; Andrews, 796 P.2d at 1095-96.
147. See. e.g., Kutsugeras, 973 F.2d at 1344-45; Jimenez, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 566; Cota, 684 P.2d
at 895-96; Reed, 494 N.W.2d at 230; Andrews, 796 P.2d at 1095-96.
148. 494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992).
149. Id. at 225-26.
150. Id. at 226.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 227-28.
153. Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224, 229-30 (Iowa 1992).
154. Id. at 230.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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fault is legally irrelevant to the cause of enhanced injuries, but also
because the very concept of enhanced injury fairly apportions fault and
damages on a comparative basis. 58 The defendant-manufacturer is liable
only for that portion of the plaintiff's injuries proximately caused by its
breach-the enhanced injuries."9 The plaintiff is responsible only for
that portion of her injuries proximately caused by her breach-the
primary injuries. 60
IV. WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD NOT USE A PLAINTIFF'S
PRIMARY FAULT TO REDUCE THE PLAINTIFF'S
RECOVERY FOR ENHANCED INJURIES
Washington courts should not use a plaintiff s primary fault to reduce
a plaintiffs recovery for enhanced injuries. Under the enhanced-injury
doctrine, the primary accident and injury enhancement are two separate
torts, each consisting of its own distinct negligence elements. Therefore,
the mere fact that a plaintiff has breached a primary duty-and is thus
guilty of primary fault-does not mean that the plaintiff has breached an
enhanced-injury duty-and, thus, is not necessarily guilty of enhanced
injury fault. Furthermore, under Washington's scheme of comparative
fault and law of proximate cause, a court cannot reduce a plaintiffs
recovery for enhanced injuries if the plaintiff is guilty of only primary
fault (and not enhanced injury fault). Finally, using primary fault to
reduce a plaintiffs recovery for enhanced injuries will result in
decreased product safety, windfalls for manufacturers, and punitive
consequences for plaintiffs.
A. Under the Enhanced-Injury Doctrine, Fault for Enhanced Injuries
Is Separate and Distinct from Fault for Primary Injuries
Under the enhanced-injury doctrine, the primary accident and injury
enhancement are two distinct torts.'' An enhanced-injury duty is a duty
158. Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d 548, 566 (D.S.C. 1999).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Baumgardner v. Am. Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 756-58, 522 P.2d 829, 832-33;
see also supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text; supra Section ll.B. Enhanced injuries are
defined both by the type of harm and by the severity of the harm. Hence, an enhanced injury may be
an additional type of harm that occurs-for example bums are a different type of harm than bumps
and bruises. However, the enhanced injury may also be an increase in the severity of the same type
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to reasonably prevent only the enhancement of primary injuries; a
separate duty governs the prevention of un-enhanced primary injuries.' 62
Moreover, an enhanced injury is, by definition, separate and distinct
from a primary injury; it is an enhancement of a primary injury due to
some conduct-for example, production of a defective product-that did
not cause the primary accident but enhanced the injury suffered in the
primary accident. 163 Proof of injury enhancement is essential for the
survival of an enhanced-injury claim; before addressing the question of
apportioning fault for an enhanced injury, the trier-of-fact must first find
an injury enhancement that is distinct and separate from the primary
injuries. 64 Therefore, courts must analyze the negligence elements of the
injury enhancement separately from the elements of the primary
accident.
Some courts refuse to separate the primary accident from the injury
enhancement. 65 For example, in Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper
Aircraft Corp.,66 the decedent negligently caused his plane to crash but
allegedly died as a result of the defendant's failure to provide a shoulder
harness restraint system.167  The court ruled that the plaintiffs
contributory negligence in causing the initial accident should be
compared with the defendant's failure to provide a shoulder harness
of harm-for example, severe whiplash, bumps, and bruises are different than minor whiplash,
bumps, and bruises.
162. See Baumingardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 756-58, 522 P.2d at 832-33; see also supra notes 28-29
and accompanying text; supra Section II.B.
163. See Bauigardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 752, 522 P.2d 829 at 830 (stating that a court must
decide "whether the manufacturer of an automobile involved in a collision is liable for injuries
caused or enhanced because of a defect ... even though the defect did not cause or contribute to the
collision itself."); see also Harris, supra note 2, at 649 ("The [enhanced injury] theory should be
applied to any situation in which an object or conduct does not cause contact, but wrongfully causes
the damage from the contact to be greater than it would have been had a deficiency in the object or
conduct not existed.").
164. See Baungardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 758, 522 P.2d at 833 ("[Tlhe plaintiff has the usual
burdens of proof as in any negligence action including proof of the nature and extent of the injuries
proximately caused or enhanced by the defect."); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 30, at
165 ("[Plroof of damage [is] an essential part of the plaintiff's case.").
165. See. e.g., Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414, 1419 (10th Cir. 1996); Keltner v. Ford
Motor Co., 748 F.2d 1265, 1267-68 (8th Cir. 1984); Hinkamp v. Am. Motors Corp., 735 F. Supp.
176, 178 (E.D.N.C. 1989); Trust Corp. of Mont. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093, 1098
(D. Mont. 1981); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 428 (Tex. 1984).
166. 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981).
167. Id. at 1094.
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restraint system because courts should consider all of the factors that
contributed to the event that caused the plaintiff s injuries.168
Other courts consider the primary accident and the injury
enhancement as two separate events and, therefore, two separate torts. 169
For example, in Reed v. Chrysler Corp.,7° an intoxicated plaintiff
negligently drove his Jeep off the road, causing a rollover accident. 7 '
Due to an allegedly defective top, the plaintiffs arm became pinched
between the Jeep's roll bar and the highway, causing severe fractures. 72
The Iowa Supreme Court held that the initial rollover accident was a
separate tort from the arm fractures, reasoning that the enhanced-injury
theory presupposes the occurrence of primary accidents, whatever their
cause, and therefore focuses solely on the enhancement of injuries."
Unlike the Piper Aircraft court, the Reed court considered the injury
enhancement separately from the primary accident and, consequently,
considered the elements of fault for the primary accident separately from
the elements of fault for the injury enhancement. The Reed approach is
consistent with the enhanced-injury doctrine.
Courts that treat the primary accident and injury enhancement as a
single, indivisible event gloss over the analytical distinctions between
primary accidents and injury enhancement required by the enhanced-
injury doctrine. Because only injury enhancement is at issue in an
enhanced-injury claim, only enhanced-injury fault is relevant when
apportioning fault for enhanced injuries. Many courts that fail to make
the distinction between the primary accident and injury enhancement
may actually be faced with cases that should be dealt with at the
damages stage, prior to the issue of apportionment. For example, in
Piper Aircraft, it may not have been possible to distinguish between the
injuries caused by the plane crash and the allegedly separate injuries that
resulted from the defective restraint system.'74 Therefore, there was
168. Id. at 1098.
169. See, e.g., Kutsugeras v. AVCO Corp., 973 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (7th Cir. 1992); Jimenez v.
Chrysler Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d 548, 566 (D.S.C. 1999); Timmons v. Ford Motor Co., 949 F. Supp.
859, 862-63 (S.D. Ga. 1996); Cota v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 684 P.2d 888, 895 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984); Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224, 230 (Iowa 1992); Andrews v. Harley Davidson,
Inc., 796 P.2d 1092, 1095-96 (Nev. 1990).
170. 494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1993).
171. Id. at 225-26.
172. Id. at 226.
173. Id. at 230.
174. Trust Corp. of Mont. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093, 1094 (D. Mont. 1981); see
also Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414,417 (Tex. 1984) (involving airplane crash).
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likely no separate injury enhancement and, consequently, the issue of
apportionment would not have arisen.
Once it is established that there is a distinction between primary
injuries and injury enhancement, a court must consider the elements of
fault for each harm separately. In negligence law generally, each distinct
harm corresponds to an equally distinct duty to reasonably minimize that
harm. "'75 A party's duty to prevent one harm does not necessarily mean
that the party has a duty to prevent another harm. 76 Therefore, the duty
to prevent an injury enhancement, which by definition is a separate harm
from a primary injury, is distinct from the duty to prevent a primary
injury. In an enhanced-injury claim, a court must determine which
parties had a duty to prevent injury enhancement, which is necessarily a
separate inquiry from whether those same parties had a duty to prevent
primary injuries. 177
Moreover, breach of a duty to prevent enhanced injury is not
necessarily the same as breach of a duty to prevent primary injuries.'78
Conduct constituting breach of an enhanced injury operates
independently from conduct constituting breach of a primary duty and
brings about a different type of harm.'79 Breach of the primary duty, for
example Mary's failure to stop at the stop sign, leads to primary
injuries-the bumps and bruises. Breach of the enhanced-injury duty-
the gasoline tank defect-brings about an enhancement of the primary
injuries-the severe bums. Therefore, a party's conduct must be
compared to that party's distinct duty to determine whether the party has
breached that duty.
175. See Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. Ltd. (the "Wagon Mound
#1"), [1961] App. Cas. 388, 426 (P.C. 1961); see also supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
176. See Overseas Tankship, [1961] App .Cas. at 426; see also supra notes 72-74 and
accompanying text.
177. See Baumgardner v. Am. Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 756-57, 522 P.2d 829, 832
(1974); Overseas Tankship, [1961] App. Cas. at 426; see also supra notes 66-74 and
accompanying text.
178. See Overseas Tankship, [19611 App .Cas. at 426; see also supra notes 75-77 and
accompanying text.
179. See Overseas Tankship, [1961] App. Cas. at 426; see also supra notes 75-77 and
accompanying text.
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B. Under Washington 's Comparative Fault Scheme, a Court Cannot
Hold a Plaintiff Responsible for Enhanced Injuries if the Plaintiff
Has Breached Only a Duty To Prevent the Primary Accident
In order to show that the plaintiff was also partially at fault for the
enhanced injuries, the defendant must show that the plaintiff had a duty
to avoid injury enhancement, the plaintiff breached that duty, and the
plaintiff's act was a proximate cause of the enhanced injury.80
Frequently, a plaintiff will not have a duty to prevent injury
enhancement because the enhanced injuries are not foreseeable from the
plaintiffs perspective.' Furthermore, conduct that constitutes breach of
a primary duty cannot constitute breach of an enhanced-injury duty.'82
Moreover, a plaintiffs primary fault is not a proximate cause of
enhanced injuries under Washington law.'83 Washington's statutory
comparative fault scheme supports this analysis.'84 Finally, plaintiffs can
be apportioned responsibility for enhanced injuries only if they are
guilty of enhanced-injury fault. 8 Therefore, Washington courts should
not reduce a plaintiffs recovery for enhanced injuries based on primary
accident fault.
180. An enhanced-injury claim consists of the basic elements of negligence. Baumgardner, 83
Wash. 2d at 758, 522 P.2d at 833. The elements of negligence are duty, breach, causation, and
damages. Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 129 Wash. 2d 43, 48, 914 P.2d 728, 731 (1996);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 30, at 164-65. A finding of comparative fault involves the same
considerations as a finding of negligence. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (2000) ("Fault includes
acts or omissions... that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of
the actor or others .... "); see also Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash. 2d 833, 838, 854 P.2d 1061,
1064 (1993) (quoting Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 238,
588 P.2d 1308, 1314 (1978) ("A plaintiff's negligence relates to a failure to use due carefor his own
protection .... ")); KEETON Er AL., supra note 16, § 65, at 451 ("Contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection."). Therefore, to
find an enhanced injury plaintiff guilty of comparative fault, a court must find (1) that the plaintiff
had a duty to herself to reasonably minimize a foreseeable risk of enhanced injury, (2) that the
plaintiff breached her duty, and (3) that the plaintiff's breach proximately caused (4) an enhanced
injury.
181. See infra Part V.B.1.
182. See infra Part IV.B.2.
183. See infra Part IV.B.2.
184. See infra Part IV.B.2.
185. See infra Part IV.B.4.
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1. A Plaintiff's Breach of a Primary Duty Cannot Constitute Breach
of a Duty To Avoid Injury Enhancement
To find that a plaintiff has breached an enhanced-injury duty, a court
must first determine that the plaintiff had an enhanced-injury duty. 86
Duty depends on foreseeability of the harm.'87 To impose a duty on a
plaintiff to avoid enhanced injuries, it must be foreseeable from the
plaintiffs perspective that her conduct raises an unreasonable risk of an
enhanced injury.'88 Therefore, a plaintiff cannot have a duty to avoid
injury enhancement unless she can foresee the injury enhancement.
Frequently, an enhanced injury is simply not foreseeable to a plaintiff
and, therefore, the plaintiff will not have a duty to prevent it. 8 9 For
example, it is disingenuous to claim that Mary, our hypothetical
plaintiff, should foresee the risk of disabling bums if she runs a stop sign
at fifteen miles per hour. Certainly, her conduct raises a foreseeable risk
of primary injuries-bumps and bruises. However, Mary can have a duty
to prevent the bums only if the risk of bums is foreseeable to her.
Requiring Mary to foresee the bums would require her to foresee the
hidden defect in the gasoline tank; this is inconsistent with imposing an
enhanced injury duty on the manufacturer: the manufacturer is liable for
enhanced injuries resulting from such defects, but is relieved from such
liability due to Mary's failure to foresee the manufacturer's breach. 9 °
Some commentators have expressed concern that the severity of the
primary collision is intrinsically linked to the severity of the resulting
enhanced injuries.' 9' However, this concern pertains to the scope of an
enhanced-injury duty, not to the apportionment of enhanced injuries
between parties. An enhanced-injury duty necessarily recognizes the
foreseeability of not just the occurrence of primary accidents, but also
186. Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 756-57, 522 P.2d at 832 (stating that primary determination
with enhanced injury doctrine is whether a duty was owed).
187. King v. Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 248, 525 P.2d 228, 234 (1974); Wells v. City of
Vancouver, 77 Wash. 2d 800, 802-03, 467 P.2d 292, 294-95 (1970).
188. Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 757, 522 P.2d at 832 (stating that key in determining whether
an enhanced injury duty is owed is whether risk of enhanced injury is reasonably foreseeable); see
also King, 84 Wash. 2d at 248, 525 P.2d at 234; Wells, 77 Wash. 2d at 802-03, 467 P.2d at 294-
95; Palsgrafv. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
189. See Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 757, 522 P.2d at 832 (stating that imposition of an
enhanced injury duty turns on foresecability of the risk of injury enhancement).
190. See Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 757-58, 522 P.2d at 832.
191. See Vickles & Oldham, supra note 112, at 439-40.
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the severity of such accidents. 92 Therefore, an enhanced-injury duty
requires reasonable minimization of the risk of injury enhancement in
accidents of a foreseeable severity. 9 3 For example, it is foreseeable that
Mary will cause a side impact collision in which the vehicles are
traveling anywhere from one to Y miles per hour. The fact that a primary
accident at Y miles per hour will result in greater injury enhancement
than a primary accident at Y-1 miles per hour does not change the fact
that the Y miles per hour accident was foreseeable and, thus, the
manufacturer had a duty to reasonably minimize the risk of injury
enhancement in that accident. In addition, the manufacturer need only
take reasonable steps to prevent injury enhancement. 94 Hence, if the
manufacturer takes reasonable steps, but the plaintiff causes a primary
accident at Y+1 miles per hour and, thus, suffers injury enhancement
anyway, the manufacturer is not liable for the enhanced injuries because
they could not have been prevented by reasonable precautions."'
Because the primary and enhanced-injury duties are distinct and
separate,'96 a plaintiffs conduct that constitutes breach of a primary duty
does not necessarily constitute breach of an enhanced-injury duty.
Conduct constitutes breach of an enhanced-injury duty when it is
foreseeable that the conduct raises the risk of the injury enhancement. 7
Therefore, conduct constituting breach of a primary duty could also
constitute breach of an enhanced injury duty only if it is foreseeable that
192. This proposition is implicit in the concept of foreseeing circumstances that give rise to a risk
of injury enhancement A side-impact automobile collision at thirty miles per hour might raise a
foreseeable risk of injury enhancement, while the same collision at two miles per hour might not.
See, e.g., Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495,502-03 (8th Cir. 1968):
The intended use and purpose of an automobile is to travel on the streets and highways, which
travel more often than not in close proximity to other vehicles and at speeds that carry the
possibility, probability, and potential of injury-producing impacts.... [Therefore,] the
manufacturer should ... be held to a reasonable duty of care.., to minimize the effect of
accidents.
193. See id.
194. See Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 756, 522 P.2d at 832 (stating that, as with negligence
defendants generally, "a manufacturer is not expected to produce an accident-free product, it is not
an insurer of the users of its product and it need not adopt every possible safety device").
195. See id. at 756-57, 522 P.2d at 832-33. In this hypothetical example, the manufacturer could
also seemingly avoid liability because the Y+I miles per hour collision was not foreseeable.
196. See id. at 756-58, 522 P.2d at 832-33; see also supra notes 161-164 and accompanying
text.
197. See Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 754-57, 522 P.2d at 831-33; Palsgrafv. Long Island R.
Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928); Overseas Tankship (U.K) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. Ltd.
(the "Wagon Mound #1"), [1961] App. Cas. 388, 426 (P.C. 1961); IEETON ET AL., supra note 16,
§ 43, at 280-81; see also supra notes 18-21, 59-65, 75-77 and accompanying text.
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the conduct in question also raises the risk of injury enhancement. Many
courts that compare primary fault with enhanced-injury fault skip this
foreseeability analysis. Without an additional duty to prevent enhanced
injuries, a plaintiff cannot breach a duty to prevent enhanced injuries.93
Even if an enhanced injury is foreseeable to a plaintiff, however,
conduct constituting breach of a duty to prevent primary injuries, by
definition, cannot constitute breach of a duty to prevent enhancement of
primary injuries because it is the breach of a primary duty that gives rise
to the imposition of an enhanced-injury duty. An enhanced-injury duty
presupposes the occurrence of primary accidents; an enhanced-injury
duty requires reasonable minimization of the risk of injury enhancement
because it is foreseeable that a primary accident will occur, regardless of
its cause. Therefore, the risk of enhanced injuries-the only harm at
issue in an enhanced-injury claim-cannot arise until a primary accident
and primary injuries have already occurred.' 99 Given that primary
injuries may occur, a duty to prevent injury enhancement requires
additional conduct to prevent enhancement of the primary injuries.
Therefore, in order for there to be a breach of an enhanced-injury duty,
there must be some conduct other than that constituting breach of a
primary duty.
2. Plaintiff's Primary Fault Cannot Be a Proximate Cause of Injury
Enhancement
The statutory changes made to Washington's comparative fault
scheme support the separation of primary fault from enhanced-injury
fault required under the enhanced-injury doctrine. Washington's
comparative fault statutes indicate that a plaintiff is responsible only for
injuries that she actually caused."' 0 The statutes make no reference to the
enhanced-injury doctrine. 0 ' However, the 1981 Tort Reform Act
provides that a claimant's contributory fault proportionately diminishes a
claimant's recovery of damages only "for an injury attributable to the
claimant's contributory fault."' Furthermore, the 1981 Tort Reform
198. See Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 758, 522 P.2d at 833; Overseas Tankship, [1961] A.C. at
426; see also supra notes 29, 57-60, 66-77 and accompanying text.
199. See Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 757, 522 P.2d 833; see also supra notes 15-25 and
accompanying text.
200. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.22.005, .015, .070 (2000).
201. See supra Part II.A.
202. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005 (emphasis added).
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Act adds that, when apportioning fault under Washington's comparative
fault scheme, a court must consider the extent of the causal relation
between each party's conduct and the resulting damages.20 3 Finally,
under the 1986 Tort Reform Act, when apportioning responsibility for a
plaintiff's damages, only the fault of entities that "caused" the plaintiff's
damages is relevant when apportioning responsibility for the damages.'
By definition, primary fault is not "fault" with respect to enhanced
injuries because primary fault constitutes the breach of a duty to prevent
primary injuries, not the breach of a duty to prevent enhanced injuries.0 5
Therefore, under Washington's comparative fault scheme, a plaintiffs
primary fault cannot be considered during apportionment of enhanced
injuries; only breach of an enhanced-injury duty-enhanced-injury
fault-may be considered during enhanced-injury apportionment.
Some courts have ruled that a plaintiffs primary fault is a proximate
cause of enhanced injuries, thereby reducing a plaintiffs enhanced-
injury recovery." 6 Many of these courts assume that primary fault is a
proximate cause of enhanced injuries.20 7 Other courts analogize to the
doctrine of subsequent tortfeasors." 8 These courts reason that it is just as
foreseeable to a tortfeasor who causes a primary automobile accident
that equipment in a car may be defective as it is that a doctor may
negligently treat the plaintiffs injuries, thereby causing additional
injuries.29 Because the primary tortfeasor is liable in the latter case for
the additional injuries caused by negligent medical treatment, these
courts reason that the plaintiff in an enhanced-injury claim should be
held at least partially responsible for causing the enhanced injuries.210
However, even if a plaintiff has a duty to prevent injury enhancement,
primary fault is not a proximate cause of enhanced injuries under
Washington law because enhanced-injury fault constitutes a superseding
203. Id. § 4.22.015.
204. Id. § 4.22.070(1).
205. See id. §§ 4.22.005, .015, .070; see also supra Section II.B.
206. See, eg., Hinkarnp v. Am. Motors Corp., 735 F. Supp. 176, 178 (E.D.N.C. 1989); Zuem v.
Ford Motor Co., 937 P.2d 676, 681-82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Meekins v. Ford Motor Co., 699
A.2d 339, 346 (Del. 1997); Kidron, Inc. v. Carmona, 665 So. 2d 289, 292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995); Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp., 897 S.W.2d 684, 694 (Tenn. 1995).
207. See, e.g., Hinkamp, 735 F. Supp. at 178; Zuern, 937 P.2d at 681-82; Meekins, 699 A.2d at
246; Kidron, 665 So. 2d at 292; Whitehead, 897 S.W.2d at 694.
208. See, ag., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1217-18 (Alaska 1998); Moore
v. Chrysler Corp., 596 So. 2d 225, 238 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
209. See, eg., Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at 1218; Moore, 596 So. 2d at 238.
210. See, eg., Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at 1218; Moore, 596 So. 2d at 238.
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cause of enhanced injuries.z'" An intervening act is a superseding cause
when the act is not reasonably foreseeable. 2 Typically, an act is a
superseding cause when (1) the act brings about a different type of harm
than otherwise would have resulted from the actor's conduct; or (2) the
act operates independently of the situation created by the defendant's
conduct.2 3 By definition, enhanced injuries are distinct from primary
injuries; enhanced injuries are an enhancement of primary injuries.1 4
Furthermore, breach of an enhanced-injury duty operates independently
of the cause of a primary accident; an enhanced-injury duty presupposes
the occurrence of a primary accident.
Even if a breach of an enhanced-injury duty was not a superseding
cause of an enhanced injury, primary fault should not constitute a legal
cause of an enhanced injury under Washington law. In Washington,
legal causation involves a determination of whether, as a matter of
policy, the connection between the defendant's breach and the resultant
harm is too remote or insubstantial to impose liability.2 1 This question is
similar, but not identical, to the question of duty. 16 By imposing an
enhanced-injury duty, the Supreme Court of Washington has said that
plaintiffs have the right to be free from unreasonable risks of enhanced
injuries in primary accidents. 27 Because plaintiffs maintain this right,
and because it is foreseeable that primary accidents will occur,
manufacturers must take reasonable care to prevent further injuries.218
Therefore, to penalize the plaintiff for the manufacturer's failure to
reasonably minimize a foreseeable risk of injury enhancement is
211. See McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 136 Wash. 2d 350, 358, 961 P.2d 952, 957
(1998); Bullard v. Bailey, 91 Wash. App. 750, 758-59, 959 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1998); Cramer v.
Dep't of Highways, 73 Wash. App. 516, 520-21, 870 P.2d 999, 1001; Anderson v. Dreis & Krump
Mfg. Corp., 48 Wash. App. 432, 442-43, 739 P.2d 1177, 1184 (1987).
212. McCoy, 136 Wash. 2d at 358, 961 P.2d at 957; Bullard, 91 Wash. App. at 758-59, 959 P.2d
at 1127; Cramer, 73 Wash. App. at 520-21, 870 P.2d at 1001; Anderson, 48 Wash. App. at 442-
43, 739 P.2d at 1184.
213. Campbell v. ITE Imperial Corp., 107 Wash. 2d 807, 813, 733 P.2d 969, 973 (1987);
Anderson, 48 Wash. App. at 444, 739 P.2d at 1185.
214. See Baumgardner v. Am. Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 752, 522 P.2d 829, 830; Harris,
supra note 2, at 649; see also supra note 163 and accompanying text.
215. Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Mkt., Inc., 134 Wash. 2d 468, 478-79, 951 P.2d 749, 754 (1998);
Taggart v. Sandau, 118 Wash. 2d 195, 226, 822 P.2d 243, 258 (1992); Hartley v. Washington, 103
Wash. 2d 768, 779, 698 P.2d 77, 83 (1985).
216. Schooley, 134 Wash. 2d at 479, 951 P.2d at 755; see also supra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text.
217. See Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 758, 822 P.2d at 833.
218. Id.
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inconsistent with imposing an enhanced-injury duty in the first place. In
addition, because it is foreseeable that primary accidents will inevitably
occur, the manufacturer is almost always in the better position to prevent
enhancement of the primary injuries sustained in primary accidents.219
Therefore, the manufacturer should be responsible for minimizing the
risk of injury enhancement in such accidents.
3. Courts That Use Primary Fault To Reduce Recovery for Enhanced
Injuries Often Mischaracterize the Relevance of Primary Fault
During Apportionment of Enhanced Injuries
Courts that compare primary and enhanced-injury fault under
apportionment for enhanced injuries mischaracterize the primary issue
presented when applying comparative fault to enhanced-injury claims:
what conduct may be considered fault with respect to enhanced injuries.
Some courts incorrectly frame the issue as whether comparative fault
should apply to product liability, strict liability, or enhanced-injury
claims. ° In Washington, comparative fault is the law and, therefore,
should apply to enhanced-injury claims. The real issue is the relevance
of primary fault when comparative fault is applied to an enhanced-injury
claim. Put another way, the issue is whether primary fault may be
considered "fault" with respect to enhanced injuries. Prior to reducing a
plaintiffs recovery for enhanced injuries, a court must, at minimum,
address this question. Consequently, the court must address the elements
required to prove "fault"-duty, breach, causation and damages-with
respect to the enhanced injuries. m
219. In some cases, a plaintiff is also in a good position to reduce the risk of injury enhancement.
For example, a motorcyclist can reduce the risk of enhancement of injuries sustained in a
motorcycle accident by wearing a helmet. However, product users are typically unable to prevent
injury enhancement once primary accidents occur. For example, Mary could do little about the
defect in the gasoline tank that caused severe bums.
220. See, &g., Zuern v. Ford Motor Co., 937 P.2d 676, 681-82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Daly v.
Gen. Motors Corp, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Cal. 1978); Kidron, Inc. v. Carmona, 665 So. 2d 289, 292
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Day v. Gen. Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349, 357 (N.D. 1984);
Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp., 897 S.W.2d 684, 694 (Tenn. 1995).
221. Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 758, 522 P.2d at 833 (stating that elements of an enhanced
injury claim are the negligence elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages); Geschwind v.
Flanagan, 121 Wash. 2d 833, 838, 854 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1993) (noting that a plaintiff's negligence
is failure to exercise due care toward herself); KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 65, at 451
("Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
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4. Plaintiffs Can Be Apportioned Responsibility for Enhanced
Injuries, but Only If Guilty of Enhanced-Injury Fault
At least one commentator has argued that a plaintiffs enhanced-
injury recovery should be reduced by the plaintiff's primary fault based
on the erroneous notion that, otherwise, plaintiffs are not deterred from
misconduct.22 However, the fact that a plaintiff's primary fault cannot
be used to reduce a plaintiffs recovery for enhanced injuries does not
mean that a plaintiff can never be apportioned responsibility for her
enhanced injuries. If a primary accident is foreseeable to a plaintiff, and
it is foreseeable that the accident will give rise to a risk of injury
enhancement, then the plaintiff must take reasonable steps to minimize
the risk of injury enhancement in the event that the primary accident
occurs.2 3 If the plaintiff fails to take such steps, her recovery for
enhanced injuries should be proportionately reduced by such failure. For
example, if a plaintiff sues the manufacturer of a motorcycle helmet,
alleging a defect in the helmet caused an enhancement of her injuries in
a motorcycle accident, the manufacturer should be permitted to
introduce evidence, if any, that even though the helmet was defective,
the plaintiff wore it incorrectly, thereby contributing to the enhancement
of her injuries. Moreover, plaintiffs are deterred from misconduct by the
legal consequences of their primary fault; a plaintiffs recovery for
primary injuries is reduced proportionately by the plaintiffs primary
fault.
224
protection."); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (2000) (defining "fault" to include negligent actions
toward oneself); see also supra note 180.
222. See Vickles & Oldham, supra note 112, at 440.
223. See Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 754-57, 522 P.2d at 831-33; Palsgraf v. Long Island R.
Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928); KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 43, at 280-81; see also supra
notes 18-21, 61-65 and accompanying text.
224. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.005, 4.22.015, 4.22.070 (detailing reduction of a plaintiffs
recovery under Washington's comparative fault scheme); Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc.,
129 Wash. 2d 43, 48, 914 P.2d 728, 731 (1996) (stating elements of negligence are duty, breach,
causation and damages); Geschwind, 121 Wash. 2d at 838, 854 P.2d at 1064 (noting that plaintiff's
negligence relates to failure to use due care for her own protection); KEETON ET AL., supra note 16,
§ 30, at 164-65 (stating elements of negligence).
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C. Reducing a Plaintiff's Enhanced-Injury Recovery by Primary Fault
Will Decrease Product Safety
1. The Purpose of the Enhanced-Injury Doctrine Is To Require
Tortfeasors (Not Victims) To Pay for Enhanced Injuries
By adopting the enhanced-injury doctrine, the Washington Supreme
Court has provided that product users are entitled to be free from
unreasonable risks of injury enhancement in the event of primary
accidents.' Courts that compare primary fault with enhanced-injury
fault when apportioning responsibility for enhanced injuries undermine
the enhanced-injury duty by contradicting this bedrock principle of the
enhanced-injury doctrine. The purpose of the enhanced-injury doctrine is
to hold parties responsible for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent
foreseeable risks of enhanced harm. 6 A duty to reasonably minimize
enhanced harm is imposed because it is foreseeable that Mary will be
involved in a side-impact collision.2' Therefore, a court that uses a
plaintiffs primary fault to reduce her enhanced-injury recovery uses the
very reason for imposing an enhanced-injury duty to reduce the penalty
for breach of that duty. Such a reduction is logically inconsistent with
the imposition of an enhanced-injury duty. The enhanced-injury
tortfeasor (manufacturer) escapes liability due to conduct for which the
law has already determined it should be liable, and the reason that the
tortfeasor escapes liability is the same reason for which the law imposed
liability2
8
225. See Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 758, 522 P.2d at 833. This is merely the correlative of
duty. By imposing a duty of care on one party to reasonably minimize the risk of harm to another
party, a court is effectively granting the latter party the right to be free from the unreasonable risk of
that harm. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale UJ. 16, 28-32 (1913); Arthur L Corbin, Legal Analysis and
Terminology, 29 Yale U. 163 (1919).
226. See Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 756-58, 522 P.2d at 832-33.
227. See Baumgardner, 83 Wash. 2d at 757, 522 P.2d at 833.
228. This is akin to the following scenario: a duty is imposed to stop at a red light (D) because of
the foreseeable risk of collision (FR) if drivers do not stop at red lights. However, the existence of
the foreseeable risk of collision (FR) is then used to reduce the punishment for breaching the duty to
stop at the red light (D). In other words, D is imposed because of the existence of FR, but the
penalty for breaching D is reduced because of the existence of FR.
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2. Permitting Reduction of an Enhanced-Injury Recovery by a
Plaintiff's Primary Fault Reduces Incentives for a Manufacturer
To Create Safer Products
Reducing a plaintiffs enhanced-injury recovery by a plaintiffs
primary fault will decrease manufacturers' incentives to implement
safety precautions in products and, therefore, lead to decreased product
safety. Washington's product liability law imposes liability on a
manufacturer where the burden of implementing a safeguard (B) is less
than the probability that injury will occur absent the safeguard (P)
multiplied by the magnitude of injury that will occur (L)."29 This creates
an incentive for a manufacturer to undergo the burden of designing and
constructing a safety precaution into its product where B<PL."3 '
Therefore, when B<PL, the result is increased product safety. If a
plaintiffs enhanced-injury recovery is reduced by a plaintiff's primary
fault, however, the amount of damages that a manufacturer is required to
pay for causing enhanced injuries is correspondingly reduced. Instead of
the formula reading B<PL, it reads B<PL-X, where X is the amount of
reduction."' Hence, the manufacturer's incentive to implement the
safety precaution is reduced by the factor X, making the incentive PL-X
instead of PL. In cases where the value of B is between PL and PL-X,
the "X factor" is determinative. The manufacturer will suffer no liability
for failing to implement the safety precaution because, while B is less
than PL, B is greater than PL-X. Therefore, the manufacturer lacks the
incentive to implement the safety precaution and the result is a more
dangerous product.
Some commentators have argued that reducing a plaintiffs enhanced-
injury recovery by a plaintiffs primary fault is necessary to encourage
safety on the part of product users.232 However, there is no need to add
this extra layer of incentive for product users to use reasonable care.
Product users already have sufficient incentives to use reasonable care,
as they are already held accountable for the damages foreseeably caused
229. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030 (2000).
230. See generally United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
231. "X" is the amount of damages for which the tortfeasor is not legally responsible. It is
calculated in the following manner: from the total amount of fault determined to have proximately
caused the enhanced injuries, take the percentage erroneously attributed to the primary fault (Cf) and
divide it by 100. Then multiply the answer by P. Finally, multiply this second answer by L. In other
words, X = (Cr/I 00)PL.
232. Vickles & Oldham, supra note 112, at 440.
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by their fault. 3 For example, Mary is fully responsible for the primary
damages resulting from her failure to stop at the stop sign-the
passengers' bumps and bruises, and the dented automobiles. It is
extremely undesirable not only to suffer primary damages, but also to be
responsible for those primary damages. For that reason, product users
will use reasonable care to avoid primary accidents, and an additional
layer of incentive is unnecessary.
3. Precluding the Use of Primary Fault To Reduce a Plaintiff's
Recovery for Enhanced Injuries Would Avoid Windfalls for
Defendants and Punitive Consequences for Plaintiffs
Using primary fault to reduce the amount that an enhanced-injury
tortfeasor must pay for causing enhanced injuries gives the tortfeasor a
windfall. Such a reduction relieves the tortfeasor from paying for all of
the damages caused by its conduct and, therefore, fails to hold the
tortfeasor fully accountable for the consequences of its actions. On the
other hand, separating primary fault from enhanced-injury fault prevents
plaintiffs from effectively paying punitive damages. A plaintiff who has
breached a duty to prevent primary injuries, but not a duty to prevent
injury enhancement, is legally responsible for the primary injuries, but
not the injury enhancement. Therefore, reducing the plaintiff's recovery
for enhanced injuries by her primary fault forces her to pay for harm for
which she is not responsible and, in effect, punishes her for being a
victim of enhanced injuries.
As one court has recognized, if properly applied, the enhanced-injury
doctrine itself prevents windfalls because it inherently apportions fault
on a comparative basis."4 The primary accident tortfeasors are liable
only for that portion of the plaintiffs injuries proximately caused by
their breach-the primary injuries-while the enhanced-injury
tortfeasors are liable solely for the portion of the plaintiffs injuries
proximately caused by their breach-the enhanced injuries. Thus, the
enhanced-injury doctrine implicitly incorporates comparative fault
principles and thereby prevents windfalls to both enhanced-injury
victims and enhanced-injury tortfeasors.
233. This is basic negligence law, which holds a party responsible for harm when (1) a party had
a duty to reasonably minimize a foreseeable risk of harm, (2) the party breached that duty, and (3)
proximately caused (4) harm. KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 38, at 239.
234. Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d 548,566 (D.S.C. 1999).
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V. CONCLUSION
Washington courts should not use primary fault to reduce a plaintiff's
recovery for enhanced injuries. The enhanced-injury doctrine is merely
an application of basic negligence law; parties are liable for failing to
reasonably minimize foreseeable risks of harm. Hence, the adoption of
the enhanced-injury doctrine recognizes that manufacturers should be
accountable for failing to reasonably minimize foreseeable risks of
injury enhancement. Since its adoption, however, many courts have
undermined the enhanced-injury doctrine by improperly applying
comparative fault schemes to enhanced-injury claims. In Washington,
comparative fault law requires courts to hold parties responsible for only
the consequences of their actions. Thus, when applying comparative
fault to enhanced injury claims, Washington courts must take care to
determine what conduct constitutes fault with respect to enhanced
injuries. Only breach of a duty to minimize injury enhancement-
enhanced injury fault-can be considered when apportioning
responsibility for enhanced injuries. Permitting use of primary fault to
reduce a plaintiffs recovery for enhanced injuries constitutes a violation
of established tort law principles (foreseeability, proximate causation
and comparative fault), will result in decreased product safety, and
undermines a fundamental purpose of the enhanced injury doctrine and
tort law generally: holding tortfeasors responsible for the consequences
of their actions.
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